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Abstract 
During any pandemic, it has long been known that local jurisdictions would need to be self-sufficient 
with little or no outside assistance, particularly from the federal government. While all eyes have been on 
California, New York, and Massachusetts, the capacities of health systems in other states have yet to be 
put to the test. If there are subsequent waves of COVID-19 and other jurisdictions see significant 
increases in disease spread, the systems used to respond will become critical. 
Using a review and synthesis approach, this article explores our collective experience and knowledge 
as it pertains to use of alternate care sites for dealing with the patient surge created by a disease 
outbreak. Probing the concept of alternate care site (ACS) systems reveals various types of alternate 
care sites that may be employed during an outbreak. The historical value of ACS models used during 
outbreak response are discussed. This culminates in the development of a notional response model and 
list of actions that should be taken by all jurisdictions as we prepare for additional waves of disease. 
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1. Introduction 
As the COVID-19 outbreak accelerates across the globe, increased attention is being focused on 
preserving the healthcare infrastructure while meeting excess demands created by the disease. At the 
time of this writing, the case numbers are reported to be plateauing in the United States (Today, 2020). 
The U.S. curve is based most heavily on New York and other hard-hit areas with intense transmission. 
There are at least two reasons that emergency planners and health system leaders should not lower their 
guard: first, the epidemic curves for each region and community will be different; while New York 
plateaus, other areas may still be closer to the beginning (Today, 2020). Second, outbreak histories of 
SARS and influenza have often included additional waves (Campbell, 2006; Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2018a). Therefore, it remains critical that planners and leaders continue to 
develop and enhance plans to preserve health systems during this pandemic.  
On March 2, 2020, nearly 500 public health professionals and 14 organizations signed an open letter to 
Vice President Mike Pence and other officials outlining principles and practices underpinning a fair and 
effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Gonsalves et al., 2020). Among the first of these 
principles is an enhanced capacity to manage the surge in demand for healthcare resources in a way that 
protects both the healthcare workforce and patients. They recognized the “health system will face 
severe burdens under all plausible scenarios” (Altevogt, Stroud, Nadig, & Hougan, 2010; Gonsalves et 
al., 2020). The purpose of developing this surge capacity is to preserve medical resources for the 
duration of the outbreak while continuing to deal with causes of morbidity and mortality unrelated to 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus (Altevogt et al., 2010; Watson, Rudge, & Coker, 2013).  
During this period it is likely that mortality from all causes will climb; having more than doubled 
during previous outbreaks (Madhave et al., 2017). During the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa 
routine care encounters declined, causing an indirect death toll nearly equal to the direct death toll 
(Madhave et al., 2017). A 2013 study into the effects of the 2006 H1N1 influenza pandemic concluded 
mortality risk for stroke, congestive heart failure, and acute myocardial infarction found a significant 
increase (Rubinson et al., 2013). The outbreak has even caused instability in the nation’s blood supply 
(Mast, 2020; World Health Organization, 2020).  
Mathematical modelling forecasted that millions of people will die from COVID-19. Clearly, the 
mechanisms used to respond will be critical if we are to minimize morbidity and mortality from all 
causes, while avoiding collapse of the system itself. While there is an abundance of information 
available for dealing with a patient surge resulting from conventional disasters, there is a dearth of 
information on strategies for infectious disease. The distinction is important - surges produced by 
outbreaks are qualitatively different, are prolonged, and are confounded by other factors.  
 
2. Self-sufficiency of Local Jurisdictions 
It has long been known that localities will need to respond to outbreaks with little or no support from 
the federal government (Denlinger, Marsh, & Rhode, 2007; Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
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In 2006, the California Department of Health Services (2006), predicted local communities will be 
required to be self-reliant for an extended period due to expected inabilities of the federal government 
to provide support. Federal policy posited it will rely on public and private resources to meet pandemic 
preparedness, response, and recovery needs (California Department of Health Services, 2006; Delinger 
et al., 2007; Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Rapid consumption of resources nationwide 
created additional difficulties for local jurisdictions (Thompson & Van Gorder, 2007).  
CDHS predicted the total need for hospital beds will, by week two of an influenza pandemic, exceed its 
surge capacity (California Department of Health Services, 2006). By week five it would have been 
exceeded by 319%, demand for critical care beds by greater than 1,200%, and ventilators by 1,300% 
(California Department of Health Services, 2006). In like manner, Ontario, Canada forecasted a surge 
of 1823 patients per day for six weeks and an increase in ICU usage by 171% (Christian et al., 2008). 
Delia and Wood (2008) projected 25 states would exceed bed capacity within two weeks of a 
significant influenza pandemic.  
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) concluded that an event producing mass 
casualties similar to the 1918 pandemic “may render inoperable” the U.S. healthcare system (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017; Arizona Department of Health Services, 2018; Cantrill, 
Pons, Bonnett, Eisert, & Moore, 2009). In 2006, then HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt stated “any 
community that fails to prepare with the idea that somehow, in the end, the federal government will be 
able to rescue them will be tragically wrong” (Inglesby, Nuzzo, O’Toole, & Henderson, 2006). Despite 
these warnings, hundreds of thousands of cases in the U.S., and over a million worldwide, local health 
systems and emergency management personnel across the nation remain unprepared for the COVID-19 
surge.  
 
3. Preparing for an Anticipated COVID-19 Patient Surge 
Nowhere is the research – practice gap more evident than it is in public health emergency planning. 
Further, Schmoker avers, “the problem is not that we do not know enough, it is that we do not do what 
we already know” (Jackson, 2006). Contributing to this gap is the disparate nature of the evidence 
itself – coming from multiple angles of scientific inquiry and published in journal disciplines ranging 
from Manufacturing & Service Operations Management to the Journal of Theoretical Biology. The 
disparate nature of this literature makes it difficult for local jurisdictions to plan for surges created by 
pandemics (California Department of Health Services, 2006; Denlinger, Marsh, & Rhode, 2007).  
Recognized strategies enable facilities to increase care capacity by up to 30% while surging-in-place 
(Hick et al., 2006; Schultz & Koenig, 2006; Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 2015). Such 
strategies have included canceling elective procedures and admissions, reverse triage, and providing 
care in flat spaces such as parking lots, hallways, entry lobbies, classrooms, and cafeterias (Hick et al., 
2006; Schultz & Koenig, 2006; Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 2015). Utilizing these 
strategies following the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, four hospitals with a total of 1500 beds were able 
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to free up an additional 343 beds and 43 surgical suites within three hours to accommodate victims 
(Hick et al., 2006). These strategies, however, are not always generalizable to outbreak scenarios 
because: a) caring for patients in hallways may amplify disease spread, and b) patients with disease 
may require more than brief periods of time. The Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) released a benchmark for surge capacity during an infectious disease outbreak of a minimum 
of 500 beds per million residents (Delia & Wood, 2008).  
 
4. Healthcare Coalitions and the Need for a Systems Approach 
A disease outbreak is felt by the whole of society; no single organization can effectively prepare as a 
solitary endeavor (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017; World Health Organization, 
2014; World Health Organization, 2009). Planning and preparedness efforts that do not recognize the 
interdependent nature of all system partners will result in an uncoordinated response (World Health 
Organization, 2014; World Health Organization, 2009). The COVID-19 response requires unity of 
effort - from the nation’s highest office to individual citizens (White House Office of Intergovernmental 
Affairs, 2020). 
A healthcare coalition represents a systems approach to COVID-19 and is defined as a formal 
collaboration among hospitals, public health, emergency management, emergency medical services, 
law enforcement, and non-government organizations that are required to respond to a catastrophic 
health event (Barbera & Macintyre, 2007, 2009). The goal of the healthcare coalition is to enhance 
system resiliency, surge capacity, and continuity of operations during such events (World Health 
Organization, 2014). A systems approach allows for the maintenance of operational capabilities while 
upholding an acceptable standard of care (World Health Organization, 2009). The total system is, in 
fact, the solution. 
While the images from the 1918 influenza pandemic rightfully strike fear in the hearts of those 
responsible for surge planning, a prima facie analysis of images of alternate care sites (ACSs) used 
during the pandemic reveals that a number of persons who occupied beds were potentially capable of 
caring for themselves, as seen in Image 1. This point is further underscored by Dr. Isaac Starr’s 
first-hand account, who reported that “many seemed to have sought admission chiefly because 
everybody in the family was sick and no one was left at home who could take care of them” (Staar, 
2006). This does not need to be repeated with COVID-19, or any other disease outbreak, if systems and 
strategies are planned and executed by an organized, unified system.  
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Image 1. University of Kentucky Gymnasium during 1918 Influenza Pandemic. U.S. Library of 
Congress 
 
While not delineated in this manner, the literature suggests an effective response system requires four 
basic capabilities that will be referred to as: 
1) Enhanced assessment capability (EAC),  
2) Enhanced isolation capability (EIC),  
3) Enhanced quarantine capability (EQC), and  
4) Enhanced treatment capability (ETC).  
These capabilities can be addressed through ACS systems with the goal of keeping all who do not 
require critical care out from hospitals and clinics.  
 
5. Alternate Care Site Systems (ACSS) 
“Alternate care sites” (ACS) refer to any location outside of the normally operating healthcare system 
that are established for the purpose of addressing the outbreak. This includes any location where 
persons are monitored by health professionals or their appointees, such as the home care environment. 
This allows for a more wholistic consideration of alternate care as part of a larger “system”. An ACSS 
is a system of locations outside of hospitals and clinics established for the purpose of the treatment or 
monitoring of persons who are or may be infected with the disease in question. While the home is not 
the focus of this article, it is included because the preferred alternate location for both quarantine and 
isolation is at home on a voluntary basis (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019).  
An ACS can include shuttered hospitals, closed hospital wards, or facilities of opportunities such as a 
veterinary hospitals, schools, warehouses, auditoriums, homes, or tents (Barbera & Macintyre, 2007, 
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2009; The Joint Commission, 2006). In addition to reducing the strain on hospitals, a major benefit of 
community-based alternate care site systems is that they allow public health interventions to reach 
much more of the population sooner (Logan et al., 2014).  
5.1 Closed (“Shuttered”) Hospitals as Alternate Care Sites 
A shuttered hospital represents a better option than a school or auditorium because they were designed 
and engineered for inpatient care, including life safety systems such as fire suppression equipment 
(Zane et al., 2008). Between 1983 and 2009, there were approximately 120 permanent and temporary 
hospital closures in five Southern California counties alone (Hospital Association of Southern 
California, 2010). Between 2010 and early 2019, over 102 rural hospitals in the U.S. have closed, and 
another 430 of the remaining 2,045 rural hospitals are considered closure risks (Ellison, 2019; Kacik, 
2019). While there are consequences accompanying hospital closures, there is a positive side for 
emergency planners - a shuttered hospital can potentially provide hundreds of surge beds (Hassol & 
Zane, 2006).  
During the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Canada, a shuttered 
hospital was successfully utilized to care for healthcare workers (HCWs) who were infected while 
caring for SARS patients (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2005; Campbell, 2006; Zane et 
al., 2008). Scarborough Grace Hospital became the index hospital for the 2003 Toronto SARS outbreak 
(Campbell, 2006). On March 23, 2003 twenty-one of the hospital’s health workers reported being sick 
with fever, thereby creating an imminent hospital closure threat (Campbell, 2006). With other area 
hospitals nearing or at capacity, the hospital turned to West Park Healthcare Centre, which had 
shuttered an old TB unit three years prior (Campbell, 2006).  
Public health personnel created a brief list of selection criteria for using a closed hospital to care for the 
HCWs (Campbell, 2006). The criteria included (in descending order of stated preference): 
1) Negative pressure room with a closable door,  
2) Single patient room with its own restroom facilities,  
3) A place for cohorting patients in a building that is: 
a. Isolated, and 
b. Had an independent air handling system. 
It is the final criterion that had been met by West Park. Selecting West Park was important because it 
exemplified what the AHRQ researchers identified as facilities that are “most likely candidates for 
surge capacity expansion” in their report Use of former (“shuttered”) hospitals to expand surge 
capacity (2005, p. 1). AHRQ criteria for candidate facilities include: 
1) Recent shuttering, and/or part of a partially-shuttered hospital (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2005; Hassol & Zane, 2006).  
2) Working facilities, and life safety systems whenever possible (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2005; Hassol & Zane, 2006).  
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3) A good location with easy access (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2005; 
Hassol & Zane, 2006).  
4) Certain ownership (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2005; Hassol & Zane, 
2006). 
Combined, the lists represent a starting point for evaluating the potential suitability for use during an 
outbreak.  
5.2 Other Alternate Care Sites 
During this surge, multiple alternate care sites will be required, with each ACS likely having different 
functions. The literature supports that establishing and operating an ACS is a local responsibility 
(Florida Department of Health, 2013). However, there is minimal agreement on capabilities or services 
to be offered at an ACS during a surge following an infectious disease outbreak. The author’s 
experiences confirm that services offered will vary greatly, and the resulting model will be shaped by 
the incident. The model and operational dynamics of ACSs established at ground zero following the 
collapse of the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001 were very different from those following 
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Images 2 & 3).  
 
 
Image 2. Alternate Care Site: Surgical Unit in Haiti Following 2010 Earthquake. Photo: James F. 
Goss 
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Image 3. ACS Established at Ground Zero Following Attack on 9/11/2001. Local Deli Converted 
to Provide Emergency Care. Photo: James F. Goss 
 
There are five basic ACS types that can be derived from the literature.  
1) Primary Triage Point (PTP): The purpose of the PTP is to determine which patients should 
be cared for in a hospital, be sent home, or be cared for at an ACS (Cantrill, 2009; BCSF Partners, 
2020; Braintree Solution Consulting, Inc., 2010; California Department of Public Health, 2007). 
2) Low-Acuity Patient Care (LAPC): This type can be used to relieve hospitals of low acuity 
patients during the reverse triage process, or can be used for infected patients who require 
minimal care (Cantrill, 2009; BCSF Partners, 2020; Braintree Solution Consulting, Inc., 2010; 
California Department of Public Health, 2007).  
3) Community-focused ambulatory care clinic (C-FACC): In the context of COVID-19, this 
type can be used for mass vaccination or as a prophylaxis point of distribution (POD) (Cantrill, 
2009; BCSF Partners, 2020; Braintree Solution Consulting, Inc., 2010; California Department of 
Public Health, 2007). 
4) Disease treatment unit (DTU): This can be compared to the Ebola treatment unit (ETU) 
used in West Africa during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak or disease-specific treatment centers 
used in China in its response to SARS in 2003 and now COVID-19 (Abramowitz et al., 2015; 
Chowell & Viboud, 2015; Sterk, 2008; UN Children’s Fund, 2014; Washington & Meltzer, 2015; 
World Health Organization, 2014). This type of ACS may have specific design characteristics, 
such as one way foot traffic, and the most stringent infection control measures in place to 
minimize risk to healthcare workers (Abramowitz et al., 2015; Chowell & Viboud, 2015; Sterk, 
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2008; UN Children’s Fund, 2014; Washington & Meltzer, 2015; World Health Organization, 
2014). 
5) Community care centers (CCC): Discussed in greater detail below, these centers serve to 
sequester those who were exposed but are not yet showing signs of infection, or they may be 
utilized to isolate those who are infected when they are able to care for themselves but cannot be 
isolated at home (Chowell & Viboud, 2015). Alternatively, they could serve to capture DTU 
overflow (Abramowitz et al., 2015; Chowell & Viboud, 2015; Sterk, 2008; UN Children’s Fund, 
2014; Washington & Meltzer, 2015; World Health Organization, 2014). 
The U.S. Army conceptualized a Neighborhood Emergency Help Center (NEHC) that is scalable and 
intended for use as a primary triage point (Church, 2001). Conceptually, it can also be used as an LAPC 
or C-FACC because it is scalable - staff and beds can be added in modules (Church, 2001).   
 
6. Community Care Centers 
Those who are unable to quarantine or isolate themselves, and do not need assistance, can be 
temporarily housed in locations generally known as community care centers. During the Ebola 
emergency 2014-2015, the demand for hospital beds and safe isolation outpaced the hospital’s ability to 
accept and treat new patients. In response, the WHO and its partners communicated the Community 
Care Center (CCC) concept (Washington & Metlzer, 2015). The CCC was designed to facilitate what 
UNICEF labeled a “big tent approach” to community-based infectious disease control and prevention 
(World Health Organization, 2014). All who may have expressed any symptoms of Ebola could seek 
care in the CCC in an effort to identify, isolate, and remove potentially infected individuals from the 
community (Abramowitz et al., 2015; Chowell & Viboud, 2015; Sterk, 2008; UN Children’s Fund, 
2014; Washington & Meltzer, 2015; World Health Organization, 2014). A study found that CCCs 
averted 4,487 cases of Ebola and when combined with the definitive care offered by Ebola Treatment 
Units contributed to a reduction of new cases by 9,097 as illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1 
(Washington & Meltzer, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Approximations of the Cumulative Number of Ebola Cases with and without Ebola 
Treatment Units and Community Care Centers in Liberia between September 23-October 31, 
2014. (From Washington & Meltzer, 2015, p. 68.) 
 
Table 1. An Estimate of the Number of Cases of Ebola that were Prevented per 1% Increase in 
Patient Population in ETUs and CCCs in Liberia between September 23 – October 31, 2014 
(From Washington & Meltzer, 2015, p. 69) 
Patient care category 
Number of 
cases prevented 
Number of cases prevented per 1% increase in 
patient population* 
Ebola Treatment Units 2,244 112 
Community Care Centers** 4,487 128 
Patients in either ETUs or CCCs 9,097 165 
*This assumes a linear correlation between prevented cases and the population of ETUs and CCCs. 
**For CCCs, equivalent community settings were also considered, to include safe burial and 
community-based programs. 
 
7. A Notional Response Model 
Based on the literature, a notional model of a systems approach to a surge during this outbreak has been 
proposed below. In the model of an alternate care site system (ACSS), shown in Figure 2, hospital 
capacity has been exceeded and patients enter the ACSS. In this model, an NEHC acts as a primary 
triage point providing low-acuity (non-disease related) patient care (Church, 2001). A disease treatment 
unit and two community care centers are established nearby. One CCC is used for isolation of infected 
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persons who require little or no care, and one is utilized for the quarantine of those who cannot remain 
home during the quarantine period. A telemedicine module is set up between the NEHC and  
community care centers to assure communication between volunteers and the healthcare workers who 
are overseeing the CCCs from the NEHC.  
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Alternate Care Site System during an ODHC. The Majority of 
Patients Can be Diverted to the PTP, Which is Represented Here as an NEHC. Ideally, Those 
Requiring Critical Care are Transported Directly from the Community to Hospitals within the 
Healthcare Coalition. From There, They are Distributed to the Various Parts of the ACSS 
 
In this model, the goal is to divert the majority of patients expressing certain symptoms and the worried 
well away from coalition hospitals toward the NEHC. Low acuity patients requiring short term care 
and/or observation can be held at the NEHC. Non-infected patients who are of lower acuity can be sent 
to an ACS intended for such patients. Otherwise, patients are distributed to the home, the DTU, or one 
of the CCCs.  
Again, a home care program is emphasized because home quarantine and isolation are more likely to 
be successful if supported by volunteer and medical outreach programs (DiGiovanni, Conley, Chieu, & 
Zabarsky, 2004). Jurisdictions may consider using paramedics for home testing and follow-up in the 
home during outbreaks (Glauser, 2020).  
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8. Critical Steps to Take Now 
In a March 27, 2020 letter to emergency managers, the FEMA Administrator requested several critical 
actions be taken immediately (Gaynor, 2020). These include the following:  
1. Create a healthcare coalition if one does not already exist. Do this by bringing together emergency 
managers, public health, first responders, and all communities of interest (Gaynor, 2020). 
a) Create an alternate care site committee or team (ACSC) (World Health Organization, 2019). 
2. Inventory health system capacity (Gaynor, 2020; Dayton et al., 2006): 
a) Identify standard capacity by inventorying beds under the categories of isolation, critical care, 
and other (Gaynor, 2020; Dayton et al., 2006).  
b) Determine enhanced hospital capabilities through administrative and engineering controls 
(Barbera & Macintyre, 2007).  
3. Project requirements for different scenarios (Dayton et al., 2006). Determine the patient number that 
will be created by each scenario and create a chart of bed availability to each capacity (Dayton et al., 
2006). Table 2 represents an example chart to determine enhanced isolation capacity (EIC) needs for a 
scenario “X”. 
 
Table 2. Notional Capacity Chart. Consider Completing for Each Scenario (e.g., Severe or 
Moderate Outbreak) and for Critical Care and Isolation 
 Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Totals 
Projected Patient Number Requiring Care During 
Isolation (Scenario X) 
    
- Standard isolation capacity     
- Enhanced hospital isolation capability*     
Enhanced isolation capability (EIC) needs     
*Enhanced hospital isolation capability represents the number of additional isolation beds that can be 
created in the hospital through engineering, administrative, and other controls.  
 
4. Develop strategies to enhance capabilities through an ACSS: Identify locations as well as desired 
capacities and capabilities of alternate care sites (Gaynor, 2020). 
5. Be creative. Identify or implement help lines. Lines can be staffed by those capable of dealing with 
crises such as airline flight crew, school nurses, and psychiatric professionals (Campbell, 2006). They 
can be supervised by licensed and practicing medical professionals (Campbell, 2006).  
6. Place emphasis on home quarantine and care. Enlist the help of food delivery and other volunteers to 
provide support (Ekisin, Keskinocak, & Swann, 2013).  
7. Develop protocols for community and system paramedics to conduct COVID-19 testing at home and 
follow-up on persons identified as needing follow-up by public health personnel (Gaynor, 2020). 
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9. Summary 
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to exhaust medical systems across the globe, emergency 
healthcare planners can take this time to improve preparations, current reponse system 
conceptualizations, and identify lessons learned to apply to future pandemics. While this pandemic is 
not currently producing case rates as high as the 1918 Spanish Flu, emergency planners can easily see 
the threat posed to healthcare infrastructure by a large outbreak. Local systems need to be 
independently prepared to protect their communities during epidemics through a systems approach.  
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